The Deals of the Year: What iGaming Businesses Sell For and the Multiples Buyers Pay in 2026

Over 2025–2026, the market for buying and selling iGaming assets has divided into three price tiers. Operators with debt are being sold at 5–6 times annual EBITDA, stable businesses at 8–9 times, and for media, data, and prediction market licenses, buyers are paying amounts that cannot be explained by current profits. 15M compiled a list of transactions from January 2025 through October 2026, verified each one against the original source, and calculated the multiples in cases where the parties did not disclose them.

Key Takeaways

• The equity of evoke, an operator put up for sale in 2026, is valued at less than its annual EBITDA. Bally’s Intralot valued the equity of evoke (William Hill, 888) at £243.1 million, based on an adjusted EBITDA of £356.2 million for 2025. The difference is debt: with it included, Edison estimates the company’s value at £2.2 billion, or about 6.3x EBITDA;
• Stable operators and suppliers are being sold for 8–9x. Flutter paid €2.3 billion for Snai – 9x 2023 EBITDA; Intralot valued Bally’s International Interactive at €2.7 billion – about 8.9x according to Euroxx’s calculations; Light & Wonder acquired Grover for $850 million at closing – 7.7x;
• Affiliate assets without growth are valued at 2–4x, and buyers are increasingly paying in installments. Raketech sold Casumba for a nominal €12 million with no cash at closing and recognized a loss of about €10 million. Gambling.com paid $80 million for Odds Holdings up front and tied an additional $80 million to a doubling of EBITDA;
• Data, media and prediction markets are bought for money that EBITDA does not explain. Genius Sports paid $900 million at closing for Legend, DraftKings paid $84.8 million for Railbird with immaterial revenue, and IG Group is paying up to ~$1.3 billion for Underdog, or 2.4x net revenue.

Deal Register: 22 Transactions

The table includes transactions with disclosed amounts or terms that were announced or closed between January 2025 and October 2026, plus three benchmark transactions from 2024 for comparison. Multiples that the parties did not disclose are marked “15M estimate” – a formula is in the methodology.

Table 1. iGaming asset transactions, January 2025–October 2026, and three key transactions from 2024. Sources: 1–7, 9–12, 15–33, 36.

Evoke: How Much Does an Operator with Debt Cost?

On June 5, 2026, the boards of directors of Bally’s Intralot and evoke approved the proposed transaction. For each share of evoke, shareholders will receive 0.537 new shares of Bally’s Intralot or, if they prefer, 52 pence in cash. The total equity value is approximately £243.1 million, and the cash alternative is capped at £117.1 million. The transaction is expected to close between the fourth quarter of 2026 and the first quarter of 2027.

For a company with revenue of £1.78 billion, this looks like a fire sale, but equity here is just the tip of the iceberg. Evoke’s adjusted EBITDA for 2025 rose 14% to £356.2 million, and net leverage at year-end stood at 5.2x. According to 15M’s calculations, this represents net debt of approximately £1.85 billion. Adding this to the £243 million equity value yields an enterprise value of about £2.1 billion and a multiple of approximately 5.9x 2025 EBITDA. Edison, whose research was commissioned by Bally’s Intralot, provides similar figures: “evoke’s high net debt position takes its enterprise value to £2.2 billion, which is equivalent to c 6.3x FY25 EBITDA or 5.5x on a pro forma basis.”

Why is it so cheap? In November 2025, the British government announced a significant increase in online taxes; evoke wrote off £440.3 million in its UK Online and Retail segment and ended the year with a net loss of £549.1 million. In the first half of 2026, adjusted EBITDA fell by 10% to £150.2 million as the tax burden increased by £46 million, and leverage rose to 5.6x. Management at Bally’s Intralot promises £180 million in cost and capital expenditure savings by the end of the second year following the closing. It is the synergies, not current profits, that justify the price: without them, the buyer is taking on a business with leverage above 5x in a country where taxes have just gone up.

The financing structure of the transaction indicates that it is, in essence, a refinancing. Bally’s Intralot secured a bridge loan of up to €200 million for the cash portion, a second-lien loan of up to £889 million (in euro equivalent) to replace evoke debt maturing in 2028, and £157 million from institutional investors; the evoke revolving credit facility is being increased to £220 million.

Stable Operators and the “Entry Ticket”: 8–9x for Cash Flow, ~30x for Licenses

At the other end of the spectrum are operators that are acquired for the sake of a stable cash flow in a regulated market. In September 2024, Flutter agreed to acquire Snaitech from Playtech for €2.3 billion in enterprise value, excluding debt and cash. Flutter’s press release cites Snai’s regulated revenue for 2023 – €947 million – and adjusted EBITDA of €256 million; dividing the €2.3 billion EV by €256 million EBITDA gives 9.0x. Flutter promises at least €70 million in operational synergies, which lowers the effective multiple. The deal closed in the second quarter of 2025.

On October 9, 2025, Intralot completed the acquisition of Bally’s International Interactive for €2.7 billion: €1.53 billion in cash and €1.136 billion in new shares, after which Bally’s became the owner of 58% of the combined company, renamed Bally’s Intralot. The parties did not disclose the multiple; Greek brokerage Euroxx estimates it at approximately 8.9x EV to adjusted EBITDA for the 12 months ended June 2025. According to Edison, the combined group ended 2025 with pro forma revenue of approximately €1,086 million and adjusted EBITDA of approximately €431 million – a margin of 39.7%. It is this business that evoke is merging with; evoke’s own margin is about 20%.

Entry tickets are priced differently. MIXI offered A$1.06 per share for PointsBet, which, according to PointsBet’s own calculations, valued the company at A$353 million and represented a multiple of 25.2–32.1x EBITDA based on guidance for fiscal year 2025 (A$11–14 million). At the final price of A$1.25, the multiple is higher, about 30–38x (15M estimate: EV ≈ A$419 million ÷ EBITDA of A$11–14 million). After a bidding war with Betr, the price rose to A$1.25, and on September 12, 2025, MIXI closed the offer with a 66.43% stake. The Japanese buyer was not paying for profits, but rather for the licenses and the team in the Australian market. Another benchmark is Flutter’s acquisition of a 5% stake in FanDuel from Boyd Gaming for $1.76 billion, of which approximately $1.56 billion was for the stake itself: by 15M’s calculation, this implies a valuation of the whole of FanDuel at about $31 billion.

Suppliers: Mature at 7–9x, Growing at 15x, Failed at $5.2M

On February 18, 2025, Light & Wonder announced the acquisition of Grover Gaming’s charitable business for $850 million in cash plus up to $200 million in earn-out payments over four years. This is a rare instance where the buyer itself disclosed the multiple: “Upfront consideration implies a multiple of ~7.7x based on 2024 Grover Adjusted EBITDA” – with revenue of $135 million and EBITDA of $111 million. The 82% margin explains why buyers are willing to pay more for such an asset than for an operator.

The year’s largest deal by value was not online: on July 1, 2025, Apollo funds completed the acquisition of the gaming and digital businesses of IGT and Everi for $6.3 billion, of which IGT received $4.05 billion. The parties did not disclose the valuation multiple. A benchmark for growing online providers is NeoGames: Aristocrat closed the deal in April 2024 at $29.50 per share, valuing the company at approximately $1.2 billion – which Aristocrat’s press release described as roughly 15x adjusted EBITDA.

The most telling story is the one that never happened. In July 2024, Evolution agreed to acquire Galaxy Gaming for $3.20 per share: approximately $85 million for equity and approximately $124 million including debt, representing a 124% premium to the market. Given Galaxy’s 2024 guidance of $12–13 million in adjusted EBITDA, this represented a multiple of 9.5–10.3x (15M estimate). The deal had been awaiting regulatory approvals for two years; on July 21, 2026 – when the extended deadline of July 17 expired – Evolution terminated the agreement and paid Galaxy $5,234,678 as a termination fee. The cost of the two-year wait amounted to 6% of the equity value ($85 million).

Super Group demonstrated a third approach: rather than acquiring a supplier, it bought the technology. The company valued Apricot’s Betway platform at €140 million plus an earn-out of up to €210 million through 2035; the deal took nearly two years to close due to licensing issues, and on February 28, 2026, Super Group became the owner of the software, making the final payment of $28 million on March 31.

Evolution: A Below-Market Offer at SEK 695

The largest online provider itself became the target of a tender offer. On July 24, 2026, Candle Lake Limited announced that it directly owned approximately 30.02% of Evolution’s shares and votes; under Swedish rules, this triggers a mandatory tender offer. On August 13, Candle Lake announced a cash offer of SEK 695 per share – the closing price on July 24. The acceptance period began on August 17 and was scheduled to end around September 15.

On August 24, Evolution’s Board of Directors recommended that shareholders reject the proposal. The price was a 1.6% premium to the 20-day VWAP to July 24, but a 5.7% discount to the August 12 close (SEK 737.2). From the board’s statement: “the Offer does not reflect the fair market value of Evolution” and “the Offer is not motivated by any intention to acquire all outstanding shares in Evolution”. Evolution does not disclose who is behind Candle Lake; 15M does not name the beneficial owner until a public document is available.

What does this mean for the valuation? As of September 30, 2026, Evolution has 183,058,121 shares; at SEK 695 per share, that’s approximately SEK 127 billion for 100% (15M estimate). Adjusted EBITDA for the last 12 months is €1,364 million, with a margin of 65.7% for the nine-month period. Excluding net cash and at an exchange rate of about 11 kronor per euro, the offer corresponds to approximately 8.5x EBITDA. This is a floor, not a market price: only 0.06% of shares were tendered, and the board said the price does not reflect fair value. At the same time, the company repurchased and retired 16.2 million of its own shares.

The acceptance period ended on September 15, and Candle Lake announced the result on September 16: 111,716 shares were tendered, about 0.06%. Candle Lake’s stake is about 31.6%, or about 33.8% including total return swaps.

Media, Data, and Forecast Markets: What Are They Paying For, If Not EBITDA?

On February 5, 2026, Genius Sports announced the acquisition of Legend – a media network comprising Covers.com, Casino.org, and Casino Guru. The deal closed at $900 million ($800 million in cash and $100 million in stock), plus an earn-out of up to $300 million payable in two equal installments over two years, tied to earnings and cash flow. Financing consisted of an $850 million Term Loan B with pro forma leverage below 3.0x. Genius did not disclose Legend’s revenue or EBITDA, citing only audience metrics: 320 million visits and 118 million unique users in 2025. According to Genius’s forecast, the combined company will generate $1.1 billion in revenue and $320–330 million in adjusted EBITDA on an annual basis. Following the second quarter of 2026, Genius raised its full-year forecast to $1.005–1.025 billion in revenue and $285–295 million in EBITDA, citing “early Legend synergies” as one of the reasons.

Legend is the most expensive media and affiliate deal of the year, but the buyer didn’t acquire CPA traffic м instead, it acquired a media company with its own audience and data. Following exactly this logic, on October 21, 2025, DraftKings acquired Railbird – a CFTC-licensed exchange – for $84.8 million, of which $37.8 million was contingent. In its 10-K, DraftKings explicitly states that Railbird’s contribution to revenue is immaterial: they paid for the license, not for the business. FanDuel took the partnership route: a joint venture with the CME Group, announced on August 20, 2025, operates as a non-clearing FCM under CFTC supervision.

The next step in this series is IG Group. On July 30, 2026, it announced the acquisition of Underdog, a US daily fantasy sports and prediction markets operator, for up to ~$1.3 billion: an EV of ~$1.1 billion at closing plus an earn-out of up to ~$200 million. That is 2.4x Underdog’s net revenue for the 12 months to June 2026, a multiple disclosed by IG itself. Separately, employees will receive an MIP of up to $850 million, conditional on EBITDA of at least $400 million in 2028 and $700 million in 2029. On October 9, IG’s CEO told investors the deal reduces the group’s dependence on the UK. The deal has not closed.

Affiliates: 2–4x, Installment Plan, and Earn-Out

At the lower end of the market, Raketech sets the price. On September 24, 2025, the company sold the Casumba (Japan) assets for a nominal €12 million with no cash at closing: monthly payments through December 2029 at 8% per annum. Under IFRS 9, the fair value of this liability is approximately €7 million, and Raketech recognized a non-cash loss of approximately €10 million. The asset generated approximately €4.0 million in revenue and €2.9 million in EBITDA on an annualized basis as of the second quarter of 2025. According to the 15M estimate, this represents 4.1x EBITDA on a nominal basis and 2.4x on a fair value basis. In October 2026, the story continued: Raketech agreed to settle the earn-out with Casumba’s former sellers for €8.2 million instead of €20.3 million – the asset purchased in 2019 turned out to be more expensive at the time of acquisition than at the time of disposal.

Gambling.com Group structured a deal with Odds Holdings (OddsJam, OpticOdds) using a mirror structure: $80 million at closing ($70 million in cash and $10 million in stock) plus up to $80 million in additional payments, but the full amount is payable only if the asset’s adjusted EBITDA doubles in 2026 compared to 2024. Based on 2024 EBITDA of approximately $12 million, as reported by industry media, this represents a multiple of 6.7x at closing and 13.3x at the maximum (15M estimate). The buyer may pay half of the contingent portion in stock.

The baseline for comparison is Catena Media in 2022–2023: AskGamblers was sold to GiG for €45 million; the Italian assets were sold for €19.8 million in three tranches through the second quarter of 2025; and the British and Australian assets were sold for €6 million; in total, the three sales brought in about €71 million. In May 2024, Better Collective acquired AceOdds for €42 million – approximately 4x LTM EBITDA according to Track360 data. In 2026, neither Better Collective nor Gentoo Media announced any acquisitions with disclosed transaction amounts, while Catena Media made its first venture investment on October 21 – in Collectbase (Repackz.fun) – without disclosing the amount.

Multiples by Segment

Table 2. Multiples by segment, 2024–2026. The 15M calculations are described in the methodology. Sources: 1–5, 7–9, 11, 12, 14–16, 26, 28, 29, 31, 32, 34–38, 44.

What This Means

To operators considering a sale. The market pays 8–9x only for stable regulated revenue with no tax surprises. Leverage above 5x almost completely erodes equity: evoke, with EBITDA of £356 million, was valued at £243 million for its equity. If you’re going to sell, do it before the tax increase, not after, and with a ready calculation of synergies for the buyer – Bally’s Intralot cited these as its primary argument.

To suppliers. The gap between 7.7x for Grover and 15x for NeoGames reflects the difference between mature cash flow and growth in new markets. But a two-year wait for approvals could nullify the deal: Galaxy Gaming received $5.2 million instead of $85 million. The time required for regulatory approvals should be factored into the price just as much as an earn-out. The offer for Evolution does not set a market price: the implied ~8.5x is a floor, only 0.06% of shares were tendered, and the board said the price does not reflect fair value.

To affiliates. Without its own audience and data, the asset is valued at 2–4x EBITDA, and even that money is paid in installments: Casumba – payments through 2029; OddsJam – half the amount upon doubling profits. Legend was acquired for $1.2 billion not as an affiliate but as a media company with 118 million users. For the seller, this means two things: consider not only EBITDA but also direct traffic, and negotiate the earn-out structure in advance, because the buyer will propose it anyway.

Methodology

As of November 4, 2026. Enterprise value (EV) is taken from the parties’ press releases; where only shareholders’ equity is disclosed, EV is calculated as equity plus net debt. For evoke, net debt is derived from the disclosed leverage ratio of 5.2x and adjusted EBITDA of £356.2 million for 2025; the result (~£1.85 billion and ~5.9x) is 15M’s calculation, while Edison reports 6.3x. For Snai, the multiple is calculated as €2.3 billion / €256 million based on figures from Flutter’s press release. For Galaxy Gaming – EV of $124 million against guidance of $12–13 million. For Candle Lake – SEK 695 × 183,058,121 shares as of September 30, 2026; SEK 127.2 billion ÷ 11 SEK/EUR = €11.57 billion; €11.57 billion ÷ LTM adjusted EBITDA of €1,363.8 million = ~8.5x; Evolution’s net cash is not included. At a rate of 10.8–11.2, the result is 8.3–8.6x. For Casumba – €12 million and €7 million relative to annual EBITDA of €2.9 million. For Odds Holdings: $80 million and $160 million relative to 2024 EBITDA of approximately $12 million, based on a forecast cited by industry media; this basis is not from the Gambling.com press release. For FanDuel: $1.56 billion / 5%. The multiple for Bally’s International Interactive is based on a Euroxx valuation; for NeoGames, it is from an Aristocrat press release; and for PointsBet, it is from PointsBet’s ASX filing. Edison Investment Research was commissioned by Bally’s Intralot. The closing dates for Legend and Grover are taken from the Track360 tracker and are marked in the table. For Underdog, the 2.4x multiple is disclosed by IG: an EV of ~$1.1 billion against net revenue for the 12 months to June 2026. For PointsBet at A$1.25: EV = A$353 million + 347.8 million shares × A$0.19 ≈ A$419 million. Quotes are from public documents.

Sources

1. Bally’s Corporation, Form 8-K “Recommended acquisition of evoke plc”, June 5, 2026 — 0.537 shares / 52 pence, £243.1 million, funding limit of £117.1 million, financing, terms. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001747079/000174707926000073/baly-20260605.htm
2. evoke plc, “FY25 Results”, April 30, 2026 — revenue of £1,781.9 million, adjusted EBITDA of £356.2 million (+14%), write-downs of £440.3 million, loss of £549.1 million, leverage of 5.2x. https://www.evokeplc.com/application/files/1917/7752/8415/FY25_Results_Statement.pdf
3. evoke plc, “H1 2026 Interim Results”, August 12, 2026 — adjusted EBITDA: £150.2 million (−10%), +£46 million in taxes, leverage ratio of 5.6x; the transaction is proceeding as planned. https://www.evokeplc.com/application/files/2917/8648/4680/H1_2026_Interim_Results.pdf