Optimizely Malware Reaches Betsson, PokerStars, tombola and Betfred Sites

Security researcher Scott Helme identified 188 infected scripts belonging to 178 organisations after examining 1,611 Optimizely files. His Report URI investigation lists four gambling companies alongside banks, retailers, airlines and major technology firms.
Gambling Domains Spanned Several Markets
Helme’s gambling list covers 15 domain entries across the four brands: 13 named domains and two additional entries. The entries break down as follows:
- Betsson. Four domains, including betsson.bet.ar, www.betsson.co and www.betsson.com;
- PokerStars. Five entries, including its international website and domains for Germany, France and Portugal;
- tombola. Five entries covering British and Italian websites, including tombolaarcade.co.uk;
- Betfred. One domain, www.betfred.com.
Optimizely Fixed the Flaw Before Removing All the Code
Optimizely traced the incident to a vulnerability in its Web Experimentation account signup process. Attackers used it to impersonate project administrators without stealing their passwords.
The company’s November 17 security report records the first malicious project modification at 07:51 UTC on November 16. Suspicious activity was detected at 13:34.
Cloudflare blocked malicious outbound code at 16:06, and Optimizely closed the vulnerability four minutes later. The last injected code was removed at 22:24.
That is a six-hour, 14-minute gap between fixing the flaw and completing the cleanup.
Card-Skimming Code Appeared Nine Minutes After Detection
Helme’s analysis dates the addition of the payment-card skimmer to 13:43 UTC, nine minutes after Optimizely says it detected the attack. Earlier versions of the payload focused on replacing cryptocurrency wallet addresses.
The malicious code subsequently targeted card numbers, expiry dates and security codes entered into website forms. The investigation also identified attempts to deliver exploits to certain iOS devices.
Payment Form Design Determines the Exposure
Optimizely distinguishes between card details entered directly into a website and payments processed inside a separately hosted iframe. The malware could read vulnerable payment fields embedded directly in website pages, while protected third-party payment frames, such as those hosted by Stripe or Adyen, kept card details outside its reach. A strong Content Security Policy could also block the malicious payload.
Neither investigation establishes which payment configuration the four gambling operators used on the affected pages.
Optimizely says individual customers can obtain their precise exposure windows. The public report gives an overall timeline, leaving the exact exposure periods and player impact for the four gambling operators undetermined.
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