This case started with a penalty payment order from November 21, 2025. It targeted 3-102-903325 SRL, a Costa Rica-registered company that the KSA identified as the operator behind booms.bet.
This order required the operator to stop offering unlicensed online gambling services to players in the Netherlands. If it failed to comply, it would forfeit €420,000 for each week, or part of a week, up to a maximum of €840,000.
Why the Amount Reached €840,000
Penalty provisions clarify why the sum rapidly escalated to the maximum amount possible. Under the November decision, penalty payments became due by operation of law once the order was not complied with within the allowed timeframe.
Based on the later collection notice, compliance was required up until January 15, 2026. As stated by KSA, the order had to be re-sent on December 18, 2025. Any continued availability beyond that deadline exposed the operator to the weekly penalty payment.
What the January Inspections Found
Subsequent inspections took place on January 15 and January 22, 2026. According to those checks, players who already had an account at booms.bet could still use their login credentials to play games on the site.
This is crucial to this case. It was unnecessary to provide evidence of relaunching or re-advertising. For the regulator, it sufficed that players from the Netherlands could still use the platform to gamble. As a result, two weekly penalty increments were forfeited, bringing the total to €840,000.
No Objection and No Payment
This record also indicates that no objection was raised by the operator in connection with the first November order. Further, after receiving a notice of intention to collect on January 29, 2026, from the KSA, the operator failed to provide a reply.
As the amount had still not been paid, collection became necessary. The date of the decision to make the collection was March 17, 2026, and the decision was published by KSA on April 14, 2026.
What This Says About Dutch Enforcement
This case matters mostly because of what came after the warning. KSA did not stop at issuing the original order. It carried out follow-up checks and found that access from the Netherlands had not actually been cut off. Then, it moved to collect the full amount once the accrued penalty payments remained unpaid.
In the Netherlands, having any kind of restricted access channel available to locals could keep enforcement action alive. This case illustrates that, beyond announcing sanctions, the regulator may move to actual collection when non-compliance continues.
